Geneva faces a decision on autonomous weapons as major powers remain divided
The review conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons will decide the future of talks on systems that can select and attack targets without further human intervention.

Countries belonging to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons will meet in Geneva from November 16 to 20 with a question still unresolved: should they begin negotiations on legally binding rules for autonomous weapons? The discussion follows years of technical and diplomatic work, but governments remain divided over whether an agreement is needed and what form it should take.
The United States is proposing five years of talks aimed at non-binding guidelines, while Russia has previously resisted a mandatory agreement, Reuters reported. The agency said Moscow had not publicly stated its position for this conference. Diplomats and organizations consulted by Reuters expect difficult negotiations; the outcome remains uncertain.
Chaired by Swiss Ambassador Julien Thöni, the meeting is the convention’s seventh review conference and will take place at the Palais des Nations. Among its tasks is to decide the mandate and arrangements for future work on lethal autonomous weapon systems within that framework, according to the United Nations Office at Geneva.
What an autonomous weapon can do
The International Committee of the Red Cross describes these systems as weapons that, once activated, can select targets and apply force without another person intervening in that selection. They use sensors and previously established criteria to do so. A system might, for example, search for characteristics associated with a type of vehicle and attack when it detects a match.
That does not mean every armed drone is autonomous. A remotely piloted aircraft whose operator identifies the target and decides when to fire works differently. The distinction lies in who selects the specific target and carries out the attack after the system is activated.
Autonomy does not always require the latest artificial intelligence models, either. The Red Cross points to defense systems that detect and intercept projectiles and to some sensor-equipped munitions capable of searching for particular types of targets. Many operate according to rules and in restricted environments. The committee is concerned that more complex technology or broader conditions of use could make their effects harder to predict.
Speed is part of automation’s military appeal: a defense system can react to an incoming threat very quickly. But that same speed raises another question in a changing environment. If circumstances alter after activation, how much opportunity does an operator have to understand what is happening and stop an attack?
Existing law and proposals for new rules
The debate is not taking place in a legal vacuum. International humanitarian law already applies to autonomous weapons and their use in conflict, the Red Cross notes. Its principles include distinguishing military targets from civilians, prohibiting attacks expected to cause incidental civilian harm excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage, and taking feasible precautions.
The committee says those obligations can be difficult to meet if the person activating a weapon does not know in advance the specific target, the exact time or the location of an attack. It may also be hard to cancel an operation when civilians appear, a person surrenders or the situation on the ground changes. These problems do not arise in the same way for every system: its capabilities and conditions of use are relevant.
The Red Cross calls for binding rules prohibiting unpredictable autonomous systems and those designed to attack people, and restricting all others. The measures it supports include limits on the types of targets, the duration and area of operation, and adequate human oversight.
In August, the UN secretary-general and the committee’s president renewed their joint call for negotiations on a legally binding instrument. The US position rests on a different assessment: according to Reuters, Washington believes existing international law already provides a framework for regulating warfare and favors guidelines over new binding rules.
The difference has practical consequences. A guideline can direct states’ conduct without itself creating the same obligations as a treaty. A binding protocol, by contrast, would require negotiations over its contents and a decision on who would be bound by it. Even a mandate to negotiate would not mean a text had already been agreed.
Earlier work and the options ahead
The Geneva discussions are not starting from scratch. A group of government experts that worked from 2024 to 2026 adopted a final report on September 4 containing elements for a possible instrument and other measures, without deciding its legal nature in advance. The conference will consider that work and determine how to proceed, the UN says.
The report provides common ground for discussion; it is not a completed treaty. A central decision remains: whether governments want to turn those elements into international obligations or continue through another kind of commitment.
According to Reuters, the conference chair has proposed a two-year mandate to negotiate a binding protocol. The agency also reported a proposal by the United Kingdom, Germany and France to negotiate an instrument while leaving open for now whether it would be binding. The United States proposes five years of talks toward a non-binding agreement.
These approaches differ in both their legal objectives and their proposed timelines. The suggested periods are mandates for work, not guaranteed dates for new rules to enter into force. Final positions and any decision will depend on the conference’s deliberations.
A convention with several protocols
The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons seeks to prohibit or restrict weapons that may cause unjustifiable suffering or indiscriminate effects. It has five protocols covering subjects including non-detectable fragments, mines and other devices, incendiary weapons, blinding lasers and explosive remnants of war. According to the UN, it has 128 states parties.
Its structure allows new issues to be addressed through additional protocols, although adopting one requires governments to bridge diplomatic differences over its scope and content. The November meeting will therefore test not only how countries respond to a particular technology, but also whether they can agree on a common response to a changing way of using force.
Humanitarian organizations fear the systems could advance faster than specific rules. States that favor voluntary measures see existing law and national practices as a different path. The conference will show whether those positions allow governments to agree on a next step, and how firm a commitment it will carry.